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Abstract: A consideration of Memorabilia 4.6 as a whole and in context reveals 
that Xenophon’s Socrates taught his companions to be “more dialectical” 
(dialektikōtéroi) by deliberately offering them bad, simplistic, or fallacious 
arguments in order to provoke debate, discussion, and dialectic. This reading 
indicates why Xenophon introduces the chapter modestly by saying “I will try 
to explain even this” (the first words of 4.6.1) and why some of the arguments 
that follow have generated a decidedly mixed scholarly response. Although the 
chapter as a whole will be analyzed and discussed, particular attention is given 
to the use of the word “hypothesis” in the chapter (4.6.13-14) and the fact that 
Socrates identifies Odysseus as “a safe speaker” at 4.6.15.
Keywords: Xenophon. Socrates. dialectic. akrasía. Odysseus.
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Dialética nas Memorabilia de Xenofonte: 
respondendo a 4.6
Resumo: Uma consideração de Memorabilia 4.6 como um todo e em contexto revela 
que Sócrates de Xenofonte ensinou seus companheiros a serem “mais dialéticos” 
(dialektikōtéroi) deliberadamente oferecendo-lhes argumentos ruins, simplistas 
ou falaciosos para provocar debate, discussão e dialética. Essa leitura indica por 
que Xenofonte introduz o capítulo modestamente dizendo “tentarei explicar até 
mesmo isto” (as primeiras palavras de 4.6.1) e por que alguns dos argumentos que 
se seguem geraram uma resposta claramente heterogênea dos eruditos. Embora o 
capítulo como um todo seja analisado e discutido, uma atenção especial é dada ao 
uso da palavra “hipótese” no capítulo (4.6.13-14) e ao fato de que Sócrates identifica 
Odisseu como “um orador seguro” em 4.6.15.
Palavras-chave: Xenofonte. Sócrates. dialética. akrasía. Odisseu.
Not surprisingly, Xenophon prepares the reader for Memorabilia 4.6 in 4.52: 
after Socrates explains how continence (enkráteia beginning at 4.5.1)—explained as 
defeating pleasures (4.5.10) and achieved specifically by overcoming akrasía (4.5.8)—
is required, paradoxically3, in order to experience the most memorable pleasures 
(4.5.9), Euthydemus’ response, appropriately, is enthusiastic: “‘Completely,’ he 
said, ‘true things are you saying!’”4 He will never say anything like this in 4.6, and 
the thesis of this paper is that there is a good reason he never pronounces any of the 
many conclusions at which Socrates arrives there to be true: the arguments on which 
those conclusions depend—and thus the conclusions themselves insofar as they 
depend on them—are deliberately constructed in order to provoke debate, and they 
have done so. “How he [sc. Socrates] was making his companions more dialectical 
[dialektikōtéroi], I will try to explain even this.”5 The “I will try” that governs 4.6 as 
a whole is therefore just as appropriate as  Euthydemus’ enthusiastic response in 
4.5.9: you don’t make your companions more dialectical by telling them the whole 
truth and nothing but the truth in a straightforward manner. Despite the fact that 
2. All otherwise unidentified numerical citations will be to Memorabilia (hereafter “Mem.”). Citations 
are to E. C. Marchant (ed.), Xenophontis opera omnia, second edition, volume 2; I will hereafter use 
“OCT” as an abbreviation for this edition of the text, and “LSJ” for the current Liddell and Scott.
3. In fact, the paradox merely fleshes out the famous Socratic bon mot that hunger is best sauce, i.e., 
“for him, desire for food is relish” at 1.2.5 (all translations are mine).
4. Last words of 4.5.9; translations, as here, will err on the side of preserving Xenophon’s word order 
whenever possible.
5. First words of 4.6.1 (emphasis mine); in bracketing Greek words and phrases in quotations—as in 
discussion of those words or phrases in the text—I will convert oblique cases to the nominative, as 
here; in the text, one finds dialektikōtérous.
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4.6 has been regarded as disappointing if not scandalous6 – at least to the extent that 
it has been treated as a whole7 – several of its conclusions have created exactly the 
kind of scholarly response I am claiming it was Xenophon’s purpose to provoke8.
As a canonical example of such response, consider the first of two contiguous 
passages from W. K. C. Guthie’s magisterial A History of Greek Philosophy (p. 455):
Xenophon too bears out the intellectualism of Socratic ethics: ‘Socrates said that 
justice and the rest of virtue was knowledge’ (Mem. 3.9.5), and the same point is 
somewhat crudely developed in dialogue form at 4.6.6: no one who knows what he 
ought to do can think he ought not to do it, and no one acts otherwise than he thinks 
he ought to act.
Guthrie’s “somewhat crudely” is apt or, if anything, somewhat understated. In 4.6.6, 
the knowledge in question is ostentatiously banal: since what the law prescribes is 
just (6.16-17),9 and since those who do what the laws prescribe do what is necessary 
for them to do (6.18-19), it follows from the fact that we can only obey the laws if we 
know what they are (6.20-22) that since knowing the law is sufficient for knowing 
what we need to do (6.22-23), and since we will do what we think it is necessary for 
us to do (6.23-24), that those who know what is lawful necessarily do what is just 
and are therefore just men (6.24-27)10. Since it follows that “justice is knowledge” 
even when otherwise ignorant men simply obey laws that may well have been 
made poorly by other ignorant men11 – or, worse yet, when scoundrels simply know 
the law without seeing the necessity of obeying it12 – the culminating definition of 
4.6.6 should be viewed less as a proof-text, however crude, of “the intellectualism 
of Socratic ethics” than as a provocation: “‘Correctly, then, would we define in 
defining as just those who are knowing the lawful things [tà nómina] concerning 
men?’ ‘It seems so to me.’”13.
6. Consider the tone of Heinrich Maier (1913, p. 57-62). The most significant recent critic of 4.6 is 
Andreas Patzer, Der Xenophantische Sokrates als Dialektiker, translated as Xenophon’s Socrates as 
Dialectician in Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Xenophon; see especially p. 242-251.
7. In addition to Louis-André Dorion and Michele Bandini (eds.), Xénophon, Mémorables (p. 184-
204), see Xenophon (1923, p. xx-xxii), Leo Strauss, Xenophon’s Socrates (p. 116-124), and (more briefly 
but usefully) Christopher Moore, Xenophon’s Socratic Education in Memorabilia Book 4. Neither Maier 
nor Patzer (see previous note) discusses 4.6 as a whole, but note its prevalence in Xenophon’s Socrates 
as Dialectician (p. 234). More recently, see Thomas Pangle, The Socratic Way of Life, p. 200-207.
8. Although Xenophon is presumably imitating Socrates’ method in 4.6, my paper’s thesis takes the 
“he” who will try to make his company more dialectical (earlier glossed as “Socrates, of course”) to 
be Xenophon.
9. While examining arguments in detail, as in the remainder of this paragraph, I will supplement the 
chapter number—in this case, 6 stands for 4.6.6—with line numbers from the OCT.
10. Cf. NATALI, 2006, p.16-18.
11. See CHERNYAKHOVSKAYA, 2014, p. 221-222.
12. See STRAUSS, 2016, p. 36-37.
13. Last words of 4.6.6; cf. last words of 4.6.15, the last words of Euthydemus in Mem.
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Saving for later discussion of how the words “concerning men” connect 
4.6.6. to 4.6 generally, consider what Guthrie writes next (1969, p. 455): “In other 
places, however, Xenophon gives high praise not only to the continence of Socrates’ 
of life but to his continual commendation, in his teaching, of the virtue of self-
control – enkráteia, the opposite of that akrasía, or incontinence, which according 
to Aristotle was on his assumptions an impossibility.” After giving evidence for 
Socratic intellectualism—and thus the denial of akrasía – in the first passage I 
quoted, Guthrie’s “however” serves as a kind of English dé to the previous one’s 
unspoken mén. Naturally the note Guthrie attaches to this sentence records the 
fact with which this paper began: that the passages containing Xenophon’s “high 
praise” of enkráteia include 4.514.  But Guthrie’s rather breezy listing of three such 
passages obscures the crucial importance of the last one he cites, i.e., the one in the 
chapter contiguous with the text where intellectualism and the denial of akrasía will 
now be presented “somewhat crudely.” The noun akrasía only appears five times in 
Memorabilia. but all of them are in 4.5. While Guthrie has bigger fish to fry, and thus 
will attempt to resolve the mén/dé discrepancy in the rest of his paragraph, I would 
point backward to a hidden mén/dé in Guthrie’s first sentence: while 3.9.5 serves 
as the canonical basis for Xenophon’s confirmation of Socratic intellectualism, it is 
really only the mén to the cruder but in any case eminently debatable dé formulation 
of this “doctrine” found in 4.6.6.
So let’s get the most out of Guthrie before moving on. To begin with, he has 
put his finger on a real problem that demands explanation: there is no reason for 
Socrates to praise enkráteia if he regarded akrasía is impossible. We can, of course, 
finesse the problem by pointing out that “the denial of akrasía” is a post-Xenophon 
expression or concept, and that we should not read Aristotle back into this older 
text; less crudely, Guthrie goes on to articulate his own attempt at harmonization 
in the pages that follow (p. 456-457). But since the goal of the arguments presented 
in 4.6 is to make Socrates’ companions dialektikōtéroi, we should not be too quick 
to harmonize the debatable problem out of existence, and it is wiser to consider 
Xenophon, along with Plato, as having a lively dialogue about the denial of akrasía 
that has spanned the centuries from Aristotle to Gregory Vlastos and beyond.
With respect to Xenophon’s role in deliberately sparking this dialogue, we 
discover on looking back to the canonical proof-text of Socratic intellectualism in 
3.9.5 that Socrates contrasts the continent from the incontinent in 3.9.4—the enkrateîs 
from the akrateîs (4.18-19)15 – exactly as if both types existed, before giving the 
principal evidence others will use to prove that Socrates claimed that one of them 
doesn’t (3.9.5)16. The difference, then, between the mén of 3.9.5 and the dé of 4.6.6 is 
14. See e.g. Mem. 1.5, 2.1, 4.5.
15. Following Ven. (OCT on 3.9.4, line 18) and Marchant in Xenophon IV, p. 224.
16. See JOHNSON, 2005. p. 60, n. 41.
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not that what will later be called “the denial of akrasía” is only called into question 
in the later passage’s case because of 4.5: this happens in 3.9.4 as well. The difference 
is that the claim in 3.9.5—that, since just things (tà díkaia) “and all other such things 
that are done through virtue” are beautiful and good (5.24-25), and thus that the 
man who knows the beautiful and the good will never choose anything else (5.25-
26)—sounds a whole lot more reasonable and thus considerably less debatable than 
when tà díkaia are then “somewhat crudely” aligned with the eminently knowable 
tà nómima in 4.6.617.
Given the central importance of akrasía in all discussions of the historical 
Socrates, it is appropriate that 4.6.6 would find its place in the standard Anglophone 
History of Greek Philosophy. But with respect to Xenophon studies in particular, it 
is rather the closely related equation of the just and the lawful that has generated 
the lion’s share of scholarly response where 4.6 is concerned18. To begin with, this 
fact is grist to my interpretive mill: I see Xenophon as deliberately generating the 
subsequent scholarly debate surrounding this dubious equation in accordance 
with the didactic purpose of 4.6, i.e., to make his own readers dialektikōtéroi, just 
as Socrates had made his companions. The mere fact of this debate is, however, 
insufficient evidence of Xenophon’s intentions in this regard, and the first place 
to turn for evidence should be obvious from the foregoing: just as 4.5 prepares the 
reader for 4.6.6, so too does 4.4 prepare “Socrates’ companions” for 4.6.5-6.
But this time, there is no need to peer between the lines of Guthrie’s polished 
prose: in her chapter on “Gesetze und Gesetztreue” – and most obviously in its first 
of two parts, entitled “The Legal and the Just,” where she considers the equation 
of tà díkaia and tà nómima – Olga Chernyakhovskaya (2014, p. 198) has done all the 
heavy lifting. Consider in particular, the opening words of her final paragraph on 
4.6.5-6: “Das kurze Gespräch des Sokrates mit Euthydemus über Gerechtigkeit rüft folgende 
Fragen hervor” and then goes on mention four of them, concluding with the simplified 
version of the fourth: “D. h.: Wenn das nómimon das díkaion ist, ist auch das díkaion 
immer das nómimon?”19 after which she writes (p. 198): “That one gets no answer 
to these questions from this dialogue [sc. 4.6.5-6] and that the questions themselves 
will not be considered by Socrates himself or his interlocutor, can possibly be 
explained by this chapter’s purpose [sc. 4.6]”. My thesis, then, entails dropping that 
particular “possibly.” As for Chernyakhovskaya, she provides an up-to-date review 
of the scholarship on the subject, and after showing the limited extent to which 4.4 
17. It should not go without saying here that basic to the argument of 4.4 is Socrates’ awareness that 
voluntary law breaking exists: see especially 4.4.21: “‘For they break the laws,’ he said, ‘in many 
other ways as well.’”
18. See especially Morrison (1995); Johnson (2003) and Danzig (2009). For fuller bibliography, see 
Chernyakhovskaya (2014).
19. Cf. Marchant, Xenophon IV, p. xx, n. 1: “Compare Mem. 4.6.5-6, where the question ‘Is what the 
laws order necessarily just?’ is entirely shirked.
115
W
ill
ia
m 
he
nr
y f
ur
ne
ss
 a
lt
ma
n
 Guairacá Revista de Filosofia, Guarapuava-PR, V34, N2, P. 110-133, 2018.
issn 2179-9180
answers the questions raised in 4.6.5-6, the second part of the chapter, “Possible 
Contradictions,” while exploring three of them, creates for this important chapter a 
pleasingly dialectical structure.
What Chernyakhovskaya does not explore, then, is the further possibility 
that Xenophon’s Socrates is making bad arguments for the debatable proposition 
that the just and the lawful are the same in 4.6.5-6 deliberately in order to advance 
the purpose of 4.6. Indeed the only time she quotes the first sentence of 4.6.1 (about 
what Xenophon will try to do in 4.6) is in a note that quotes the text in Greek, 
without comment, as far as 1.17, and is attached to a sentence that is justified by 
Socrates’ claim that those who don’t know are the ones who lead others astray20. She 
comments (p. 198):
It is obvious that Xenophon exerted himself to prove the usefulness [sc. Nutzen, 
which I take to be a translation of ōphélimos] of Socrates to his interlocutors, and 
thus Xenophon’s Socrates can lead nobody into error; he must therefore know, for 
example, was is just, and must be ready to explain it.
So here’s where it gets tricky: I agree that Xenophon’s purpose is not to use his 
Socrates to lead us into error because he knows that those who become aware of the 
deliberate dialectical inadequacy of the arguments used in 4.6 will have drawn closer 
to the truth. But when he writes that it is those who don’t know who lead us astray 
(4.6.1), I am claiming that he knows while writing it – just as Plato did21 – that only 
those who know the truth can conceal it intentionally (i.e., ekṓn)22. And my proof for 
the existence of this kind of salutary literary irony is what Xenophon writes at the 
beginning of 4.7: “That, on the one hand [mén], Socrates was manifesting his own 
view [hē heautoû gnṓmē] simply [aplō̂s] to those consorting with him seems clear to 
me from what’s been said.”
In light of (1) the highly complex way 4.6 is embedded in the structure 
of Memorabilia(4) 23, another example of which I am now considering, (2) its own 
variegated structure, an investigation of which will constitute the bulk of this paper, 
and (3) the many unanswered questions raised by its individual parts—of which a 
representative few have now been mentioned—the use of the word aplō̂s here should 
be taken as a joke, i.e., as an intentionally misleading description of the previous 
chapter, and thus as an example of what I am calling “salutary literary irony.” 
20. With the ignorant ones who cause others to sphállein, cf. ho hekṑn pseudómenos kaì exapatō̂n of 
4.2.20.
21. In addition to Hippias Minor (see following note), consider also Phaedrus (261d10-262c4).
22. On the connection between 4.2.19-20 and Hippias Minor, see Phillips (1989) and Johnson (2005, p. 
52; 59-62).
23. The topics of discussion listed in 1.1.16 as well as the dialogues between Socrates and Critias 
(1.2.33-38) and between Alcibiades and Pericles (1.2.40-46) would clearly be relevant to this kind of 
contextualization as well.
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Xenophon is leading into error those who will believe that Socrates is openly (aplō̂s) 
expressing hē heautoû gnṓmē in 4.6: his Socrates was not doing so, and Xenophon 
knows it. But by using a literary device like this ostentatiously inaccurate aplō̂s, his 
culpability with respect to error is limited because he is using ironic deception for a 
salutary end: he evidently regards becoming dialektikōtéroi as intimately connected 
to the ability to spot false claims and bad arguments—as indeed he should—and he 
therefore uses the best means at his disposal in order to try to show how Socrates 
accomplished this result.
To be as clear as Xenophon says that Socrates was: I cannot prove that 
Xenophon is being deliberately deceptive for a salutary end by using aplō̂s as he 
does immediately after 4.6, or indeed by any other means: an author’s intent is 
tricky enough to discern even when it is advanced by far less dialectical methods. 
In the present case, it is impossible—not merely difficult—simply because a critic 
can safely insist on a literal reading of the text: if Xenophon writes that Socrates 
was manifesting his opinion aplō̂s, then Xenophon must have thought this to be 
the case even if in fact hē heautoû gnṓmē remains less than obvious at the end of the 
day. On the other hand, Xenophon completes this mén/dé sentence (4.7.1.23-24) in 
a way that implements and perhaps explains the theory of salutary literary irony: 
after employing literary irony through the humorous aplō̂s in the mén part of the 
sentence, Xenophon goes on to indicate its salutary purpose in the dé part (1.24-25): 
Xenophon states that of all those he knew or rather knows (1.26), Socrates was the 
most concerned with knowing what (hótou) anyone (tis) of those consorting with 
him was (actually) understanding (epistḗmōn at 1.27), for it was presumably only by 
knowing this that he could make them self-sufficient (1.24-25).
And this, I claim, is sound pedagogy, still embodied in the true/false and 
multiple-choice question: the best way to test the self-sufficiency of the student – i.e., 
to make sure the student isn’t simply following a teacher’s authority by parroting, as 
it were, hē heautoû gnṓmē—is for the teacher to offer false but not entirely implausible 
statements that students must reject, refute, or at least question in order to become 
dialektikōtéroi. And it is in order to replicate what he takes to be Socrates’ method of 
discovering the epistḗmōn tis – a phrase suggesting that those who do understand 
won’t be numerous—that Xenophon describes the completion of Euthydemus’ 
education as he does in 4.624. The fact that 4.6 is the last stage in the education of 
24. The roles of 4.7, 4.4, and 4.5 in preparing the reader for 4.6 have already been considered. But 
in referring to the completion of Euthydemus’ education, an even larger structural issue emerges: 
4.4, a dialogue with Hippias on the lawful, stands in the middle of four chapters concerned with the 
education of Euthydemus: 4.2, 4.3, 4.5, and 4.6. These four chapters are arranged in a progressive 
order: there is no contradiction with respect to making his students praktik[ṓter]oí (cf. 4.3.1 and 4.5.1) 
because 4.5 represents a higher stage of the young man’s education than 4.3, just as 4.2.8-40 depicts 
progress over 4.2.1-7, and 4.3 does the same with respect to 4.2.
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Euthydemus is therefore significant, and only the kind of dialectical or pedagogical 
reading I am proposing fully justifies its position.
As important as the context of 4.6 proves to be, it is the structure of the 
chapter itself that is most important. But even here, Xenophon has made context 
crucial: in 4.5.12, the last section of 4.5, Xenophon introduces 4.6 by explaining 
how conversation (tò dialégesthai at 12.6) makes men best, most able to lead 
(hēgemonikōtátoi), and most dialectical (12.10-11), with dialektikṓtatos, the superlative 
of which dialektikōtéroi is the comparative, being the last word of 4.5. But earlier in 
4.5.12, in describing tò dialégesthai, Xenophon writes: “And he said that tò dialégesthai 
is named from companions taking counsel together, discussing matters by kinds 
[katà génē]; it is therefore necessary to try as much as possible to make oneself ready 
for this, and to take especial care of it” (12.6-10).
About these words, much could be said, especially about the necessary 
interplay of well-prepared individual—ready, able and willing to submit himself 
to dialectic—and the collective and thus comparatively impersonal nature of taking 
counsel in common. But as a prelude to examining the structure of 4.6, it is the 
phrase katà génē that is most important, especially since it has just appeared for the 
first time at the end of 4.5.11: “but it is possible for the continent [hoi enkrateîs] alone 
to examine the most important of things, and in both word and deed discussing by 
kinds [katà génē] the good things to prefer and the bad ones to reject” (11.1-4). No 
matter how pleasant and easy it may be to read 4.6 literally as a haphazard collection 
of not very compelling claims or definitions25 – and thus as proof of Xenophon’s 
own dialectical ineptitude or even his superfluity26 – it is only those strong enough 
to overcome such easy pleasures, i.e., those prepared to submit themselves to 
Xenophon’s dialectical test27, who will recognize what they need to accept and what 
to reject in the chapter they are about to read.
I am therefore suggesting that there is a closer connection between 4.5 and 
4.6 than has been previously recognized28. Before trying to make his readers more 
dialectical in 4.6, Xenophon has emphasized the importance of the skill that will 
allow them to discern the structure of the conversations that follow, i.e., to distinguish 
25. Patzer, 2010,p. 243: “Mem. 4.6.12 then also appends onto the six short dialogues that deal with the 
definition of ethical concepts another five short dialogues of forms of political leadership”.
26. Hence the need for “Befreiung von Xenophon” in Patzer, 1999, p. 73-74.
27. Cf. 4.2.26; I am claiming, then, that Xenophon himself has the capacity to test other people 
(dokimázein at 26.10).
28. See especially Natali, 2006, p.12: “In 4. 6 we will find a rather different, but not incompatible, 
idea of dialectic; this makes it unlikely that the indications given here in connection with the idea of 
dialégein katà génē could be applied directly to the different dialectic of the following chapter”. Note 
that Natali is defending a closer connection between the two chapters than is customary on 13.
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things katà génē. This skill proves to be of crucial importance for interpreting 4.6: 
when read as a disconnected “laundry list” of topics to be defined, one is apt to miss 
the hints that Xenophon is generous enough to provide29. Here, then, are the results 
of my own attempt to do so:
1. Introduction (4.6.1)
2. Piety and Justice (4.6.2-6)
a) Piety (4.6.2-4)
b) Justice (4.6.5-6)
3. Wisdom (4.6.7)
4. The Good, the Beautiful, 
and Courage (4.6.8-11)
a) the Good (4.6.8)
b) the Beautiful (4.6.9)
c) Courage (4.6.10-11)
5. Governments (4.6.12)
6. Hypothesis (4.6.13-14)
7. Odysseus (4.6.15)
In what follows, I will consider each of these seven parts in the following order, 
much as if I were attempting to illustrate Xenophon’s use of ring-composition 
(which in fact I am not): 7, 1, 2, 6, 5, 3, and 4. What I will be trying to illustrate by 
proceeding in this manner is the chapter’s dialectical integrity, with all its sections 
connected to its overall pedagogical purpose.
I have called section 15 of 4.6 “Odysseus” because Xenophon tells us that 
Socrates used a line from the Odyssey to illustrate what he called “a safe speaker” 
(15.19). Seemingly like Socrates, Odysseus was able to present his discourses 
“through the things seeming [to be true] to people” (15.20-21). Particularly in the 
case of Odysseus, this obviously does not mean that such discourses are true30, 
so the question is really about Xenophon’s Socrates: his questionable verdict on 
Odysseus ties into the rest of the section because Xenophon has just told us that 
Socrates—“believing this to be [the] safety of a discourse” (15.16-17)—was generally 
proceeding “through the things most generally agreed upon” (15.16)31. But this 
scarcely describes with accuracy the discourses Socrates offers in 4.6, and since 
29.Cf. “Xenophontic hint” at Johnson, 2005, p. 60.
30. Cf. Johnson, 2005, p. 55 n. 32: “Thus Socrates’ seemingly banal method is comparable to that of 
Odysseus, the master storyteller and inveterate liar”.
31. A process well described in Natali (2006) in connection with the discussion of Justice in 4.6.5-
6 on 18 (emphases mine): “The consequence [sc. ‘that the right is identical to the lawful’] is not 
proved, even though it is possible that Xenophon thought that the passages were endoxastic enough 
to gain the assent of every reader.” The fact that Natali has (appropriately) grave reservations about 
this “possible” is indicated by his modifications of “endoxastic enough” later on the same page: first 
“(supposedly) endoxastic” and then “pseudo-endoxical identifications.” Identifying the latter as such is 
crucial to what I will describe as “text-imminent” criticism of 4.6 in what follows.
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Odysseus, as Xenophon well knows, is capable of telling lies that are not salutary32, 
there is a salutary literary irony at play in comparing Socrates to Odysseus as 
Xenophon does.
This becomes more obvious when the first words of the section are 
considered: “But [dé] whenever he himself [autós] was going through something in 
his discourse”. What then is the domain of this last section? Was Socrates most like 
the deceptive Odysseus when he was presenting a discourse on his own, one that 
proceeded through uncontroversial steps, thus “rendering his auditors agreeable” 
(15.18)33, or was it when he was teaching his auditors to be dialektikōtéroi by using 
another method, one that was considerable less safe, through dialogues that raise 
more questions than they answer? Or was he doing both of these things at the 
same time? Bear in mind that my purpose here and throughout what follows is not 
primarily to answer such questions by offering the reader a univocal reinterpretation 
of either Xenophon’s or his Socrates’ “teaching” in 4.6, but rather to explain how 
they taught their students or readers to be dialektikōtéroi: on my account, the aim 
of neither is to achieve a harmonizing consensus or homónoia (4.6.14). Much to the 
contrary: I am trying to show that the questions that arise from reading this chapter, 
including the unanswered ones, do so in accordance with its author’s pedagogical 
purpose and thus with his deliberate intentions.
Those intentions, of course, are described in the chapter’s first section (4.6.1). 
Here we are told for the first time in the chapter (cf. 15.16) what Socrates believed 
(enómize at 1.14):
Those [mén] knowing what each of the things that are might be [tí hékaston eíē tō̂n 
óntōn] are also able to explain [these things] to others, but [dé] it is nothing surprising, 
he said, that those not knowing both cause themselves to trip and trip up [sphállein] 
others. On account of these things, investigating with his companions what each of 
the things that are might be [tí hékaston eíē tō̂n óntōn], never was he ceasing.
Having already mentioned that Plato’s Socrates has made the opposite claim—
i.e., that it is only those who know who can effectively deceive, speak falsely in a 
consistent manner, and thus cause others to trip (see n. 21 above)—the striking thing 
in this passage is the verbatim repetition34, especially since the words tí hékaston 
eíē tō̂n óntōn suggest another Platonic parallel. In a general sense, the parallel is 
32. In addition to 4.2.33, see Xenophon, Ap. 26.
33. Cf. Strauss, 1998, p. 122: “Socratic dialectic was thus twofold: he proceeded differently when he 
talked to a ‘contradictor’ from how he did when he talked to non-‘contradictors’; only the former 
procedure led to the truth, while the latter led to agreement on the basis of generally accepted 
opinions or to concord”.
34. See Patzer, 2010, p. 243: “But this question [sc. ‘what any given thing is’] that Xenophon 
presents twice with obvious pleasure in its high philosophical tone [mit ersichtlicher Freude am hohen 
philosophischen Ton], only allows as its answer the nature of the object in question: it is the classical 
formulation that enquires of its definition”. Patzer will explain Xenophon’s failure to answer this 
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pervasive and implicates all of the dialogues of definition; indeed what follows 
4.6.1 is presented as being just enough of the things Socrates defined (1.18-19) “to 
clarify the manner [trópos] of his investigation” (1.19-20). More particularly, since 
Xenophon’s Socrates is about to consider most of the canonical virtues, i.e., piety, 
justice, wisdom, and courage35, the highly general phrase tí hékaston eíē tō̂n óntōn – 
which applies to everything that is—seems far less apt than the curious but similar 
phrase Plato’s Socrates uses in the passage illustrating the use of hypotheses in Meno 
(86b5-6): “what sort of thing is virtue among the things that are concerning the soul [tí estin 
tō̂n perì tḕn psykhḕn óntōn aretḗ]”. In other words, given what Socrates is about to do 
in 4.6, it would perhaps have been more accurate for Xenophon to have written: 
“investigating with his companions what each of the things that are perì tḕn psykhḕn 
might be.” Thanks to Xenophon’s use of hypothesis in 4.6.13, Meno will reappear 
below.
But first, there is 4.6.2-6 that I have collected katà génē. Since the section on 
wisdom (4.6.7) is not included, the principle of collection applied here does not arise 
from the fact that both Justice and Piety are virtues. As already indicated it is the 
second of its two parts (on tà díkaia in 4.6.5-6) that has attracted the most scholarly 
response, both because of its relevance to the problem of akrasía and because of 
its problematic equation of tà díkaia with tà nómima. What makes it a mistake to 
consider Justice apart from Piety is that the conclusions reached in both cases are 
parallel, with the first ending as follows (4.5-7): “‘Then the one knowing the lawful 
things [tà nómima] concerning the gods [pérì toùs theoús], will have been correctly 
defined for us as pious?’ ‘It seems thus to me,’ he said”. So all the same problems 
arise in 4.6.2-4 that will rise again in 4.6: once again the one who knows the lawful 
will do it, and once again doing the lawful is the mark of he who is pious just as 
it is of those who are just. And to ensure that we are discussing things katà génē, 
Xenophon defines the just in terms of “the lawful things concerning men [tà perì 
anthrṓpous nómima]” (6.28-29) because he has already used pérì toùs theoús here.
It is necessary to combine the discussions culminating in definitions of the 
one who is pious and of those who are just not only because of the obvious structural 
similarities that have now been sketched: their juxtaposition weakens the arguments 
used in both. Just as Chernyakhovskaya has detailed the connection between 4.6.5-
6 and 4.4, so also is 4.3 equally relevant to the discussion of piety in 4.6.2-4, and 
in tandem with it, the concept of “unwritten laws” introduced in 4.4 undermines 
the parallel on which 4.6.2-6 as a whole depends. If the gods themselves are the 
authors of the unwritten laws (4.4.19), then there is a case to be made for the claim 
question as proof of his (equally ersichtlich?) “confusion” and “carelessness of thought (not to say 
thoughtlessness)” on 244; this important sentence will be quoted in full below.
35. For Socrates’ unwillingness to distinguish temperance and wisdom, see 3.9.4; ostensibly, then, all 
five virtues are “defined” in 4.6.
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that knowing tà nómima in this sense would in fact be sufficient. But one scarcely 
needs to be dialektikṓtatos to ask what would happen if a regime were to decree as 
a matter of written law that the pronouncements of the Delphic oracle were of no 
legal value. In 4.3.16, the claim that obeying state-law (nómos póleōs at 16.22) with 
respect to the gods is sufficient for pleasing them (16.21) is the slender reed upon 
which the written or man-made nómima become the guarantors and defining feature 
of the pious man. To put the general case succinctly: there is sufficient material in 
4.3-4 to ensure that by the time the reader ponders 4.6.2-6, they will find plenty of 
things said there that they have been prepared to question, to debate, and to reject.
And with this observation, it is time to turn to 4.6.13-14, which makes a most 
promising start: “And if anyone [tis] might contradict him about anything” (13.1). 
But in conformity to the pedagogical practice that I am claiming Xenophon uses 
to try to show how Socrates made his interlocutors dialektikōtéroi, the tis bringing 
the objection is not the epistḗmōn tis of 4.7.1: it is rather the reader’s job to become 
the more dialectical companion of Socrates who will and can never appear in the 
text. Instead, the only contradicting tis that Xenophon considers is incompetent, the 
one “having nothing clear to say” (13.1-2) who “without demonstration” (13.2) is 
claiming either that this man is wiser, more of a statesman, braver—“or anything 
else among such things” (13.3-4)—than the one Socrates has named or described. 
When this kind of thing would happen, writes Xenophon, Socrates would “lead the 
whole discussion [back] up to the hypothesis [hypóthesis]” (13.4-5), i.e., away from 
what person might be braver, wiser, or more of a statesman (politikós), and back to 
the underlying problem of what, for example, constitutes the work (érgon at 14.7) of 
a statesman. In the example, then, Socrates defends himself against the troublesome 
contradictor by reminding him of the argument’s scope. But if the contradictor is 
not incompetent, and is objecting to Socrates’ conclusion, the hypóthesis in question 
will be the underpinnings of the lógos itself. To take a more relevant example, the 
fact that the only example of the use of hypóthesis presupposes a reliable Socrates 
and an incompetent objector should itself be regarded as the hypóthesis on which 
this (inadequate) example depends.
In order to become dialektikōtéroi, we must learn to discuss matters katà 
génē, and in bringing an objection to Socrates’ example of a hypóthesis, we must see 
its generic connection to 4.6.2-6. To begin with, as Andreas Patzer has pointed out36, 
the two “definitions” reached in 4.6.4 and 4.6.6, along with those of the other two 
virtues (Wisdom in 4.6.7 and Courage in 4.6.10-11), are not really definitions at all: 
36. See Patzer, 2010, p. 234-45, especially 244: “If one looks at the Xenophontic definitions more 
closely, it is clear that in four of the exemplary short dialogues between Socrates and Euthydemus 
(Mem. 4.6.2-4, 5-6, 7, 10-11 [sc. all four of the virtues ‘defined’ in 4.6] Xenophon does not define 
the thing from which the conversation starts, but always the person, who bears the thing”. So also 
Stavru, 2005, p. 148-149.
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they merely define “the one” who is, e.g., pious, and not Piety itself37. Indeed Patzer 
might well have added that these “definitions,” since they do not name any specific 
man or men38, state the characteristic érgon of, e.g., the pious or just men: in both cases, 
that they know (cf. 4.6 and 6.28)39. Bringing a lógos of this kind back to its hypóthesis 
is therefore superfluous: it is the relevant érgon that already justifies Socrates’ 
identification of the (praiseworthy) man. But if Socrates’ example of hypóthesis is 
irrelevant to these lógoi, this does not mean that these lógoi are unobjectionable, or 
that any objection to them must be unclear and ungrounded in demonstration. In 
fact, Patzer (2010, p. 65.) has clearly demonstrated the objectionable hypóthesis (or 
Grundvoraussetzung) that constitutes their basis: while purporting in 4.6.2 to inquire 
“about piety [perì eusebeías]” (2.21), Socrates immediately shifts to “the pious 
man [ho eusebḗs]” (2.23) and concludes with his characteristic érgon (4.6). Applied 
retrospectively to 4.6.2-6, then, the specific example that Socrates uses to defend 
himself against a groundless objection is not simply superfluous but—if we return to 
and question the hypóthesis of the example itself—simultaneously indicates the well-
grounded objection that a competent contradictor would bring.  In short, Xenophon 
intends the epistḗmōn tis of 4.7.1 to read 4.6.13 with the man-centered “definitions” 
of the virtues in mind, and to bring those discourses back to the relevant hypothesis.
But the specific example used in 4.6.13-14 must not be given more weight 
than it can carry, and once we have recognized that it is Socrates throughout 4.6 
who must be brought back to the hypothesis – not the inept objector who Xenophon 
uses to illustrate the process – we must distinguish at least three kinds of objection, 
the first of which, found in the previous paragraph, is based on the closest possible 
fit between the specific example and the scope of a previous argument. Two other 
kinds of objection would be based on the arguments themselves, and the first of 
these is comparative, and depends on contrasting the arguments in 4.6 with similar 
arguments elsewhere in Memorabilia. One might, for example, object to 4.6.2-4 on 
the basis of 4.4.19 by pointing out that the man who performs the state-sanctioned 
nómima concerning the gods is less, not more pious, than another man who obeys 
the unwritten laws, even when – indeed particularly when – they clash with those of 
37. In fact, this would be a very good time for the reader to remember the hammered phrase of 4.6.1: 
in order to become dialektikōtéroi, we need to consider tí hékaston eíē tō̂n óntōn, as in “What is Justice?” 
or “What is Piety?” Where Patzer (see n. 34) sees Xenophon’s confusion, I see “a Xenophontic hint” 
(see n. 29): he is alerting the dialectical reader in advance to the inadequacy of the “definitions” to 
come.
38. The careless reader of 4.6.13 will reasonably assume that the debate between Socrates and the inept 
or groundless objector initially took the form of whether or not, e.g., Pericles was more of a statesman 
than Themistocles, and that it was Socrates who brought the discourse back to the hypothesis, in this 
case, what is the érgon of the politikós. The dialectical reader, by contrast, will realize that since the 
foregoing definitions of the four virtues point to a man or class of men, they too need to be brought 
back up to the relevant hypothesis.
39. So too in the case of 4.6.7 and 4.6.11 (11.21).
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the city40. In order to adjudicate this competition between men – and thus remaining 
in the realm of the example Xenophon uses to explain the term hypóthesis – it is 
necessary to return to the question of the nómima, and how one comes to know 
them. The poignant question of 4.3 must therefore ring in our ears while reading 
the glib proceedings in 4.6.2-4: “How then can somebody [tis] honor gods more 
beautifully or piously than just as they themselves command, thus to do?”41.
But it is not difficult to give text-imminent examples as well, although it may 
well be objected—on the basis of the example—that the word hypóthesis no longer 
applies to the (false) Grundvoraussetzungen of each specific argument. In the case of 
4.6.2-4, for example, its lógos hinges on the hypothesis that deî (“it is necessary”)—
introduced by Euthydemus in the context of what obedience to the laws requires 
(2.25-26)—can ground the claim that nobody will honor the gods differently from 
how one thinks it is necessary to so (3.1-2). It is clear that deî must temporarily take 
on an absolute sense42, independent of what the law requires or any consequences of 
breaking it. So when Socrates asks: “Therefore, the one honoring [the gods] legally 
[nomímōs], honors [them] as it is necessary [deî]?” (4.3-4), he is entitled to the response 
“How could it not be so?” only if he is asking Euthydemus to affirm a tautology43, 
i.e., if this deî involves only legal necessity44. But if this is so – if the question merely 
asks Euthydemus to affirm a tautology – Socrates’ argument fails since it is scarcely 
necessary to do as the law requires45. As for applying the word “hypothesis” in this 
way, the beauty of Xenophon’s decision to use the word only once is that the very 
fact that it is underdetermined forces the reader—especially those who are going 
to become dialektikōtéroi and hēgemonikōtátoi—to think for themselves, and grasp 
on their own that since every discourse has its hypotheses, their nature necessarily 
depends on the specific argument in question46.
The justification for increased flexibility in considering what Xenophon 
means by hypóthesis increases when we consider the political example Xenophon 
40. Cf. Johnson, 2003, p. 258-263.
41. 4.3.16; This kind of cross-textual example confirms Socrates’ contention that only the continent are 
capable of investigating the strongest things (tà krátista) and discoursing katà génē (4.5.11) precisely 
because this still leaves plenty of scope for dialectical incontinence, i.e., for the pleasant weakness of 
absolute dependence on textual literalness.
42. Cf. the repeated use of the intermediate hà deî práttein in 4.2.4: morally necessary as opposed to 
either legally or absolutely necessary.
43. Cf. “pseudo-endoxical identifications” in Natali, 2006, p. 18.
44. Cf. Xénophon, 2011, p. 198 n. 2.
45. Strauss is amusing on this point while discussing Piety in 2016, p. 36: “Piety is a virtue, hence it 
must be a kind of knowledge. And what kind of knowledge? The knowledge of the laws regarding 
divine worship. Now of course this is atrocious. Don’t you believe that Alcibiades knew these laws 
very well when he profaned the mysteries and mutilated the statues of Hermes? So then he was a 
pious man”.
46. It would be naïve, for example, to insist that the only hypotheses deployed by Socrates in Plato 
(Men. 87b2-89c10) are the ones he explicitly flags as such (e.g., 87d2-3); Plato tries to draw our attention 
to a particularly important one immediately thereafter at 87d4-8 without using the word.
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uses of “bringing the whole discourse back to the hypothesis” in 4.6.14: it is hardly 
more useful than the mathematical example Plato’s Socrates uses in Meno (86e4-87b2) 
to explain hypóthesis there, raising as it does more questions than it answers47. The 
guiding question, of course, is what constitutes the work (érgon) of the good citizen 
(agathòs polítēs at 14.7), and Socrates will give four examples of such “works.” It may 
be important that this is the second appearance of the word érgon in the chapter: 
the first time Xenophon used it, he applied to his own task: it would require “much 
work” on his part to go through all of Socrates’ definitions (4.6.1). But certainly by 
the time we reach 4.6.14, if not before, it has become clear that it is not the definitions 
themselves by which Socrates will make his companions dialektikōtéroi, but rather 
by bringing to their attention the need to return to the relevant hypotheses on which 
those definitions depend. And the fourth of the works is particularly relevant—in 
a dialectical sense, that is—to Xenophon’s current érgon48: in the case of dēmēgoría, 
ridiculed by Socrates in his first conversation with Euthydemus (4.2.3), the good 
citizen’s work is to implant homónoia, just as the Odysseus-like safe-speaker of the 
next section will do49.
Importantly, this is not the only echo of 4.2 in 4.6.14: the other is found in the 
section’s last word, where Xenophon sums up 4.6.13-14 as a whole: “And thus, with 
the discourses brought back up [sc. to their hypotheses], even to the contradictors 
themselves [kaì hoi antilégontes autoí], manifest [phanerón] was becoming the truth 
[talēthés]”. It’s easy to miss what makes this sentence crucial: this is the only time in 
Memorabilia that the word “truth” appears with an article and in the singular. The 
only other time “truth” appears with an article (albeit in the plural) is in 4.2.21, at 
the conclusion of a passage relevant to the dialectical reading of 4.6 on offer here. 
As Plato’s Socrates does in Hippias Minor, Xenophon’s Socrates argues in 4.2.18-20 
that the one who errs voluntarily is more knowledgeable than the one who does so 
involuntarily, and that not even to friends must one always haploízesthai, a marvelous 
47. For recent attention to the passage, see Benson, 2015, p. 116-129.
48. It is somewhat strange that the other three characteristic “works” of a good citizen (14.8-13) 
find parallels in Xenophon’s own writings: to say next to nothing about the relevance of Anabasis 
and Hellenica to 14.10 and of Cyropaedia to 14.11-12, consider the connection between 14.8-9 and 
Poroi, the last thing we can be sure that Xenophon was revising before his death (4.51): “Thus in the 
administration of resources, would he not win [the title of ‘good citizen’] who is making the city 
more well-provisioned [euporōtéran] with resources?”
49. Cf. Patzer, 2010, p. 250: “Xenophon can hence presume to say that he knew nobody who secured 
such consensus (homologoûntas pareîkhen) from his listeners as Socrates (Mem. 4.6.15). If that were 
really the case, we would remain unable to discover how Socratic philosophy managed to develop 
the explosive force it did.” What robs Xenophon’s account of Socratic dialectic in 4.6.13-15 of its 
capacity to explain this (aptly named) “explosive force” is that an unadventurous literalism allows 
us to consider only a Socratic monologue that aimed at consensus (on the one hand) and a dialogical 
return to hypothesis, initiated by Socrates, in response to inept objectors; this ignores the fact the 
objector might have been provoked to make an apt objection by the kind of “safe-speaking” famously 
associated with the monologues of Odysseus; see especially Od. 19.203.
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verb defined as “behave simply, deal frankly” in LSJ, but best understood in the 
context of Memorabilia (4) as “to speak haplō̂s”.
And this, of course, is precisely what I am claiming that Socrates is not 
doing throughout 4.6: his arguments are deliberately flawed, and thus cannot 
be described—to use another marvelous word—as anamphilogṓtaton (4.2.34)50. 
Moreover, it is only by returning to their Grundvoraussetzungen that his friends 
can discover the errors and equivocations on which they depend. It is therefore 
another example of salutary literary irony when Xenophon uses the concessive kaí 
in the conclusion of 4.6.14: it is rather only hoi antilégontes autoí who, by virtue of 
those very objections, are becoming dialektikōtéroi, and thus for whom the truth 
is becoming manifest51. But when nobody asks such questions, safe-speakers like 
Odysseus (15.19), proceeding just they please, and with nobody there to bring 
them back (14.14), reach conclusions calculated to implant homónoia by any means 
necessary, and thus to put an end to the conversational stásis (14.12-13) that creates 
dialectic52. My claim is that the purpose of 4.6 as an integrated whole is to undermine 
conversational tyranny by illustrating its flagrant abuse while at the same time 
hinting at the methods necessary for—and thus provoking—its overthrow.
And this suggests the connection between 4.6.13-14 and 4.6.12, the section 
in which politics enters the chapter. On the other hand, the question of regime and 
leadership has been with us from the start: in the last sentence of 4.5, Xenophon tells 
us that it was from tò dialégesthai that not only the most dialectical would emerge, 
but also the best and those most capable of leadership, i.e., the hēgemonikōtátoi. Only 
among those antilégontes who did have something clear to say (13.1-2) would not 
lack a demonstration that there were more pious and just men than those Socrates 
appeared to be praising in 4.6.2-6. Those two “definitions” are once again especially 
pertinent because of the return of the words nómos and nómima in 4.6.1253, and 
also because in the case of tyranny, the ruler leads “however he might wish” and 
without laws (12.27-28). This recalls the basis of the earlier definitions: the law-based 
conceptions of both the pious man and the just men began—in 4.6.2 and 4.6.5—by 
ruling out the possibility that one can honor the gods or treat (khrē̂sthai) human 
beings “in what manner one might wish” (2.24-25 and 5.8-9) in specific contrast 
with the laws and the lawful. But since there are no laws for the just or pious men 
to know (12.27), would that mean that there was no way to be either pious or just in 
such a regime? One imagines that both Socrates and Xenophon would have found 
50. LSJ: “undisputed, undoubted” in the superlative.
51. Cf. Strauss,1998, p. 122: “only the former procedure led to the truth”.
52. For Strauss, unfortunately : the only alternative to “dialectics strictly understood” is rhetoric, 
which Xenophon’s Socrates therefore taught (1998, p. 123). Cf. Natali, 2006, p. 12-13, especially 13 n. 
33, and Xénophon, 2011, p. 205 n. 3.
53. The word nómos is used seven times in 4.6.5-6, the same number of times nómima and nomímōs 
are used in 4.6.4-6 (there are likewise seven appearances of each in 4.5); each is used once in 4.6.12.
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a way to be so even there54. At the very least, one can imagine a thoughtful auditor 
making such an objection.
Whether or not Xenophon expected us to think of him while reading 4.6.14 or 
4.6.12, he clearly intended us to think of Socrates while reading the discourse about 
Wisdom in 4.6.7. First of all, Socrates gives another “definition” that describes “a 
wise man” (sophós at 7.12) by his érgon rather than defining sophía itself, as he set out 
to do (7.1). And since that “work” in question is, once again, knowing (epístasthai at 
7.12), the account of this third virtue aptly follows the brittle or banal intellectualism 
of 4.6.2-655. There is, however, an account of sophía in the argument, and it functions 
on my account as the argument’s (text-imminent) hypóthesis: wisdom is epistḗmē (7.7-
8)56, and thus one is wise solely in relation to what one knows (7.12). An objection 
to the argument based on other passages in Memorabilia is of course also possible, 
and when Euthydemus, in (forced) agreement with Socrates, asks: “For how could 
anyone [tis]—in respect of the things he does not know [epístasthai]—be wise with 
respect to them?” (7.4), it would be impossible not to think of one particular tis 
who is wise precisely because he knows the things he does not know. What Plato 
will have his Socrates call “human wisdom”57 has been explained by Xenophon’s 
Socrates at the start58, and Xenophon will remind us in 4.7.1 that Socrates knew 
the things he did not know, and acted accordingly with respect to them (1.29-30). 
In fact, the (human) wisdom of Socrates informs the awareness of Euthydemus—
that erstwhile know-it-all and (former) admirer of the sophists (4.2.1)—that it is 
impossible (“by Zeus” at 7.10) for a man to know all the things that are (tà ónta pánta 
epístasthai at 7.9)59.
And with this, we finally reach the middle of 4.6: the “definitions” of the 
Good (4.6.8), the Beautiful (4.6.9), and Courage (4.6.10-11), considered as a unity katà 
génē. Why they should be so considered is not difficult to see: the first thing Socrates 
asks Euthydemus about Courage is whether it is one of tà kalá (10.29-1), and the 
54. As for the latter, I suggested in the context of 4.6.14, that in considering the érgon of the “good 
citizen,” the medium becomes the message, and in the context of 4.6.12, “Xenophon the Athenian” 
constitutes an ongoing dialectical problem for salient questions about citizenship and polities. For 
example: if those who hold office in a democracy are drawn from all (12.31), including those who 
do not fulfill tà nómima (12.28-29), on what grounds is Xenophon something other than a citizen 
of Athens? Can his exile be in accordance with the laws (12.26-27) even if his various works show 
him to be a good citizen? Has not a tyrant, albeit a many-headed one, done as he pleased (12.28) 
while ruling over the unwilling (12.27)? On the central position of aristocracy in the list of three, see 
Strauss, 2016, p.38.
55. Cf. Johnson, 2003, p. 274: “But his [sc. Xenophon’s Socrates’] intellectualism is entirely banal if all 
that one needs to know is what the statutes require.”
56. On the basis of his refusal to distinguish Wisdom from Temperance at 3.9.4, we could say that 
Socrates defines all five virtues in 4.6.
57. Pl. Ap. 20d8 and 23a6-7.
58. See 1.1.2-16, especially 7-8.15-20, 9.27-29 and 6-9, and 1.11 as a whole.
59. For the refutation of “those believing [themselves] to know all things [hoi pánt’oioménoi eidénai],” 
see 1.4.1; note that this passage confirms the practical synonymy of eidénai and epístasthai.
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young man not only echoes his verdict on Piety (4.6.2) that it is so (it is kálliston at 
10.1), but confirms the move that renders it “useful” (khrḗsimon at 10.1-3), thereby 
establishing a more substantive link with “the beautiful.” But the courageous are 
said to be “good” (agathoí at 10.9)—and the cowardly “bad” (10.10-11)—in a manner 
that has little apparent and no explicit connection with their being “beneficial” (cf. 
8.17-20), and both the definitions of “good” and “beautiful” come together when 
the agathoí are said to kalō̂s khrē̂sthai (11.12-13) those things in relation to which 
courage is the, i.e., “the terrible and dangerous things” (first at 10.3-4). Since the verb 
khrē̂sthai dominates the section as I have defined it—eight uses of the infinitive in 
4.6.8-11, as well as three other verb forms in tandem with four uses of khrḗsimon—
the shades (and slides) of meaning involved should be clarified at the outset.
To begin with, then, tò khrḗsimon is “the useful,” and as the passage’s most 
astute critic has emphasized60,  it is neither “the good” nor “the beautiful” that 
Socrates defines in 4.6.8-9, but rather tò ōphélimon (“the beneficial”) and tò khrḗsimon, 
the latter being (kalón), or rather “beautiful in relation to what it may be khrḗsimon” 
(9.27-28). When the infinitive khrē̂sthai appears in 4.6.8, it clearly means “to use,” and 
does so in the phrase kalō̂s ékhein khrē̂sthai, where kalō̂s is linked not “to use”—as in 
“to use beautifully” or “rightly”—but rather as kalō̂s ékhein, meaning “it is right,” in 
this case, “it is right or proper to use [khrē̂sthai].” Hence Socrates asks Euthydemus 
to agree that “in relation to what each thing may be khrḗsimon, in relation to that it is 
right [kalō̂s ékhein] to use it” (8.24.25), a tautology that is then flipped with a crucial 
supplement: “Is each thing kalón in relation to anything else than what in relation to 
which it is right to use it?” (8.25-26). When we then come to Courage, that in relation 
to which it is khrḗsimon will turn out to be “the terrible and dangerous things,” and 
the courageous—erstwhile glossed as “good”—will kalō̂s khrē̂sthai these very things 
(11.12-13), which now no longer means “to use” them, but rather “to handle” or 
“to cope with them well.” In the “definition” of kalón, then, we are invited to think 
of an appropriate tool whose strictly utilitarian “beauty” is in relation to that task 
for which it is right (kalō̂s) to use it, whereas in the definition of courage, the same 
words (kalō̂s and khrē̂sthai) reappear, but are now reconfigured grammatically and 
semantically while being linked to (morally) good men who know how to handle 
perilous situations “beautifully” as opposed to cowards, i.e., bad men, who cope 
with them badly (kakō̂s khrē̂sthai at 11.14).
Socrates distinguishes the courageous from only two other kinds of men: 
the “mad men” who are ignorant of the fact that—and thus do not fear—dangers 
that are truly dangerous (10.3-7), and the cowards who fear things that are not truly 
60. Patzer, 2010, p. 244: “Here he [sc. Xenophon] mixes up the definiendum with the definitum 
and thus gives, instead of a definition of the Good and the Beautiful, a definition of the Helpful (tò 
ōphélimon) and the Useful (tò khrḗsimon), in the sense that the former is good and the latter beautiful—a 
confusion that reminds us of the confusion of inductive and definitive formulations of the what-is 
questions [discussed on 235-36], out of which the investigation arose”.
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fearful (10.8-9). It is all very well to say that this is only a question of knowledge61, 
and that unlike the cowards (so defined) and the madmen, the brave know what 
things are and are not to be feared and “handle them appropriately.” But Socrates 
says nothing about what the verb khrē̂sthai means in the case where brave men, as 
opposed to cowards, must face things that are truly fearful, i.e., in the operative 
case. The fact that brave men are knowledgeable enough to fear the fearful tells 
us next to nothing; the question is how they handle it. It is therefore of the utmost 
importance that the slippery combination kalō̂s khrē̂sthai – which might very well 
mean “to handle beautifully” or even “nobly” – appears only after Euthydemus has 
confirmed his (true) belief that it is those who are good (agathoí at 10.9) in relation 
to the terrible and dangerous things who are courageous (10.9-10), and just as 
importantly that is the cowards who are bad (10.10-11).
As great as the shift in how khrē̂sthai is used – from the appropriately useful 
tool in relation to “beauty” (4.6.9) to the rather more responsive ability “to handle” 
or even “to cope with” in the case of dangers in 4.6.10 – the meaning of “good” 
undergoes a greater shift along similar lines: while defining agathón in relation to 
tò ōphélimon in 4.6.8, we are in the world of Protagoras62: an instrumental good is 
relative to that for which it is beneficial. But the courageous man is not an instrument, 
nor is anything said about the kind of instruments he actually uses; the shift in the 
verb khrē̂sthai ensures Socrates’ silence on this point63. Consider, for example, the 
soldier’s shield: it is beneficial to keep ahold of it while withstanding a fear-inspiring 
but resistible enemy, but when that fearful enemy becomes (apparently) irresistible, 
it is beneficial to throw that shield away and run. But Socrates cannot say such a 
thing because Euthydemus knows – and Xenophon expects the reader to know as 
well – that no manner how beneficial it may be in the case of flight, throwing away 
one’s shield is not the action of a good man or a brave one, nor could the words kalō̂s 
khrē̂sthai in relation to dangers decently apply to such a way of “handling” them, 
regardless of the thrower’s knowledge of what is or is not to be feared.
With the relevant problems associated with kalō̂s khrē̂sthai having been 
introduced in 4.6.10, the second section on Courage (4.6.11) will proceed to presume 
the same kind of brittle intellectualism already employed in the discussions of Piety 
and Justice. There, it was enough to know tà nómima – a move that might have been 
more helpful here, since leaving one’s post or throwing away one’s weapons is easily 
made unlawful64 – but now the relevant hypothesis is less concrete and even more 
debatable: those who know how to kalō̂s khrē̂sthai the dangerous things therefore 
61. See Xénophon, 2011, 2.2, p. 198-99 n. 4.
62. Pl. Prot. 333e5-334c6.
63. Especially striking in the context of, e.g., the (unusable) golden shield of 3.8.6; note khrō̂ntai and 
eúkhrēsta at 3.8.5, lines 26-27.
64. Pl. Leg. 943c8-944a2.
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know “how it is necessary to handle [hōs deî khrē̂sthai]” them (11.16-17), and those 
who know hōs deî khrē̂sthai are also necessarily able (dunásthai) to handle them in 
this way (11.17-19), i.e., kalō̂s khrē̂sthai. Those who do not handle them well must 
handle them badly (11.14), and those who err in this way (11.18-20) are the cowards 
(11.22-23); those knowing how to kalō̂s khrē̂sthai – not those who actually do so – 
are defined as courageous (11.21-22). Even though the ability to know what one is 
able and unable to do has already been identified in 4.2.25-26 as the essence of self-
knowledge (26.4-6), naturally nothing is said here of one’s limitations, physical or 
otherwise: the possibility that one may know what it would mean to kalō̂s khrē̂sthai 
in a wartime situation—we are, after all, speaking just as much about “acting nobly 
in the face of dangers” as handling them well—but yet be physically unable to do 
it, is ignored unless captious readers (hoi antilégontes of 4.6.14) themselves bring 
the objectionable hypothesis to light: “Therefore those knowing how it is necessary 
to kalō̂s khrē̂sthai are also those who are able [to kalō̂s khrē̂sthai]” (11.17-18). Not 
surprisingly, Socrates puts this in the form of a question65.
Louis-André Dorion has considered the definition of Courage in 4.6.10-11 
in relation to the fuller discussion of this virtue in 3.966, and his conclusions tend to 
confirm my claims about Xenophon’s intentions with respect to provoking the kind 
of critical response that can and must be brought to bear on other parts of 4.6. And 
since both kalón and agathón are discussed more fully in 3.8, another reason to collect 
4.6.8-11 into a unity katà génē is that all three topics implicate contiguous chapters 
in Memorabilia (3). But the most amusing instance of inter-textual criticism connects 
the discussion of tò agathón in 4.6.8 with the opening words of Memorabilia (4). While 
the first thing that Socrates asks Euthydemus to deny about tò ōphélimon in 4.6.8 is 
that “the same thing is beneficial for all [tò autò pâsin ōphélimon]” (8.15), Xenophon 
insists in 4.1.1 that Socrates was ōphélimos “in every matter [en pantì prágmati]” (1.1) 
and “in every way [pánta trópon]” (1.1-2), so that there was “nothing more beneficial 
[oudèn ōphelimṓteron]” (1.3) than consorting and conversing with him “anywhere 
and on any matter” (1.4-5). The inter-textual counterexample to the Protagorean 
relativity of tò ōphélimon in 3.8 and 4.6 is thus Socrates himself67, not because of what 
he says about tò ōphélimon, but because of what Xenophon says and tries to show 
about him throughout the Memorabilia, and particularly in book 4.
65. Consider Johnson, 2005, p. 51: “The essential failing of writing [in the context of Phaedrus 
274b-277a and the Seventh Letter] is that it is not interactive. But this need not mean that written 
texts are worthless, so long as they are treated as playful goads to active reflection rather than as 
repositories of wisdom”.
66. Xénophon, 2011, 2.2, 199: “Comme la position la plus constant de Socrate, dans les Mémorables, et de 
Xénophon, dans l’ensemble de son oeuvre, est que l’aquistition de la vertu, quelle qu’elle soit, requiert à la fois 
l’étude et l’exercise (cf. 3.9.2 […], c’est au contraire la définition de 4.6.11 qui paraît moins «socratique»”.
67. Note that Socrates thus becomes the connection between 4.6.7 and 4.8.8; this may suggest another 
way of arranging the sections of 4.6 katà génē, and I would prefer in any case to have my arrangement 
considered only as evidence of the dialectical link between 4.5 and 4.6.
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In that final book, it is the five68 chapters involving Euthydemus that 
stand out, with 4.6 as their logical culmination and fulfillment. Pivoting around 
the discussion with Hippias about law, the other four chapters are as pleasingly 
arranged as I have tried to show 4.6 to be. The developmental contradiction between 
Socrates’ purpose with respect to making his companions praktikṓteroi in 4.3.1 and 
4.5.1 has been noted above; I want to conclude with the relevant parallel between 4.2 
and 4.6. In his 2005 article Xenophon at his most Socratic (Memorabilia 4.2), David M. 
Johnson writes (p. 55): We shall therefore have to read our chapter actively, with the 
assumption that it is not meant to be simple and straightforward, i.e. that Xenophon 
is not as naïve as he is normally made out to be”. My claim throughout is that this is 
also the way that 4.6 must be read, and thus that 4.2 and 4.6 appropriately bookend 
the conversations with Euthydemus, thereby ensuring that this beautiful and well-
read young man will henceforward be one of the self-sufficient ones (autárkeis at 
4.7.1)69.
To that end I have adduced a number of ways, both inter-textual and text-
imminent, in which Xenophon alerts the reader that this is the way 4.6 in particular 
must be read. If Socrates’ text-imminent equivocation on kalō̂s khrē̂sthai – from the 
active use of the appropriate tool to the appropriate handling of a difficult situation 
– is less elegant or significant than the ongoing equivocation on eû práttein employed 
by Plato’s Socrates70, we should remember that it is Xenophon who best unmasks the 
deliberately flawed argument we find in Plato’s Euthydemus71, where Socrates makes 
bold to claim that wisdom guarantees good luck72. I raise this point about Plato at 
68. Taking the conversation Xenophon describes at 4.4.5 to be with Euthydemus; cf. 4.2.6 and 
Diogenes Laertius 2.48. On the connection with the latter, see following note.
69. Rather than regarding Euthydemus as “a rather low class man” (Strauss, 2016, p. 9) whose “was 
not a good nature” (STRAUSS, 1998, p. 94)—on which see Johnson, 2005, p. 47 n. 20—we would be 
well advised to reconsider the suggestion of H. G. Dakyns that Euthydemus is Xenophon himself; 
see Dakyns (XENOPHON, 1890-1897, p. xl-xliv): “On the personal note in the Apomnēmoneúmata: 
Who is Euthydemus? (in Bk. IV).” Although he does not cite Dakyns, an unmistakable sympathy for 
Euthydemus can be found in the valuable notes of Dorion (XÉNOPHON, 2011), and he mentions 
the “Euthydemus as Xenophon” hypothesis at p. 65-66, n. 3. Note that Xenophon could thus both 
accurately and humorously describe himself as having been present at 4.3.2.
70. Best understood in the following grammatical terms: (1) active, “to do well,” (2) middle, “to do 
well for oneself,” i.e., “to succeed,” and (3) a passive or rather responsive “to fare well.” At Plato (Alc. 
I. 116b3), for example, eû práttein is used in sense (1), immediately thereafter, at b5, in sense (3). The 
classic account of this standard trick—“the convenient ambiguity” on 335 – is Dodds, 1959, p. 335-36. 
More recently, see Cain, 2007, pp.17 and 120,  nn. 16-17.
71. Cf. Plato, Ethd. 279c9-280b5 and 3.9.14-15. Cf. the use of eû práttein at 14.8 with 15.11.
72. See Jones, 2013; Rider, 2012, p. 211-12, and especially Irwin, 1992, p. 204-205: “After finding such 
serious flaws in this argument in the Euthydemus [sc. 279c9-281e5, analyzed on 203-205] we might 
remind ourselves that the dialogue as a whole is concerned with eristic, and suggest that even the 
protreptic passages are not free of the fallacious argument that is rife in the rest of the dialogue.” 
This golden sentence is particularly striking in the context of its author’s dependence on “Socrates’ 
Philosophical Protreptic” for Socrates’ eudaemonism in Irwin, 1995, p. 52-53 (a section called “The 
Importance of Euthydemus” precedes “Eudaemonism” in ch. 4). For the doubts of Xenophon’s 
Socrates about happiness as anamphilogō̂taton agathón, see 4.2.34.
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the end only to suggest that there was really no other way that either Xenophon 
or Plato could (try to) show how Socrates made his companions dialektikōtéroi. It 
would be by placing in his mouth arguments that depended on “pseudo-doxastic 
identifications” and were therefore flawed deliberately73 – something that, to be 
pedagogically effective, required knowledge of what’s true74 – that they could move 
(cf. kineîn at 4.2.1) their readers to respond: provoking them to explain clearly – by 
means of a demonstration that led back to a moveable hypothesis (cf. Pl. Rep. 533 
c2-3) – how one might effectively contradict (antilégoi at 4.6.13) those arguments. It 
was in this way that the greatest Socratics tried to make their readers dialektikōtéroi, 
teaching all of us in the process how truth begins to become manifest.
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